

Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100070040-3

SECRET

DDMT 5444-65

10 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Special Projects

SUBJECT : Background Information Regarding:
"L" Building, VAFB

1. The status of "L" Building at VAFB has always been unlike any other CORONA program facility for two principle reasons:

- A. Location on a military base
- B. Under the jurisdiction of a component of the contractor's organization not directly responsible to CORONA management

2. The CORONA program has utilized the "L" Building from late 1959 to the present. This facility has been leased to LMSC by USAF (as are most contractor buildings at VAFB) but remains under the cognizance of the AF. Major repairs, modifications, expansion, etc. ordinarily requires AF approval since VAFB funds would normally be expended. The building has been identified on the Base as a restricted area requiring special approval for access. This is not uncommon at Vandenberg and the "L" Building blends well into this environment. No unusual security precautions are evident and there always has been an armed guard at the entrance. Due to a change in Base policy about 18 months ago, Air Police have relieved the civilian guards at most contractor facilities and an AP currently is stationed on the "door" at "L" Building.

3. Security procedures governing "L" Building have always been developed jointly by the Headquarters Security Representative and the contractor Security Officer subject to the Headquarters Security Officer's approval. The procedures, however, are also coordinated with the Launch Operations Control Officer (present incumbent is [redacted] in order to insure they may be compatible with VAFB Security regulations. Ordinarily the guard orders are written by the LMSC/VAFB Security Officer but are signed and promulgated by [redacted] The access list is prepared in a similar fashion but has been subject to review by this Headquarters Security Representative. This list contains

25X1

NRO review(s) completed.

25X1

the names of LMSC/VAFB personnel who are witting and are assigned to the "L" Building or whose duties require frequent access. In addition, the list carries the names of those AF personnel (all approved/briefed CORONA-3) assigned to "L" Building or who require frequent access. This list currently includes the senior 241 program staff members from SAFSP [redacted] etc.). In the past, certain Project Headquarters and LMSC/AF technical personnel who were widely known optics/reconnaissance experts were listed in "Lies." Visitors to the "L" Building, not on the access list, are certified through the LMSC/VAFB Security Officer who provides a pass permitting access upon proper recognition. Normally, certification has been exercised through the Headquarters Security Representative or the Launch Operations Control Officer to the LMSC/VAFB Security Officer. Whenever a question of verification of an individual's clearance has arisen, the Headquarters Security Representative is contacted. Some months ago a Signal Center was installed at "L" Building and visitor certifications of Headquarters and contractor personnel are passed over this link. SAFSP has been advised concerning use of the TWX link for certification of visitors but there is evidence they have declined to avail themselves of this means and continue to go through the Launch Operations Control Officer.

4. There is no evidence that anyone not holding a CORONA approval (with exception of maintenance personnel, etc.) has ever been admitted to "L" Building, nor have there been any reports of any violations or breaches of security relating to this facility. The writer has personally observed the security procedures employed at this facility and can state that he has always found them to be satisfactory. He can assure the reader that all of the "L" Building contractor personnel have been thoroughly indoctrinated and have displayed a keen appreciation and enthusiasm for the security and cover requirements of the program.

5. The current problem, if one exists, is mainly political and is a result of the friction between Headquarters and SAFSP. It centers about the present program management dispute, and more precisely, with the "need-to-know" approval authority. It would appear that SAFSP by deciding not to use the TWX link as directed by the Headquarters message wishes to avoid a confrontation on this point. Whether the issue should be forced by this Headquarters, at this time, is not advised by the writer. The reason being that "L" Building is really in their ballpark and security's position there is rather complicated due to the LMSC organizational problem and the special security arrangements Headquarters Security Representative has with the Launch Operations Control Officer with regard to the launch accident emergency procedure.

SECRET

DDS&T-5444-65

When resolution of the CORONA management problem has been achieved, then this issue should also solve itself. Furthermore, when the "factory-to-pad" concept is implemented, the building function will pass from the scene. It is the "Hood that "L" Building will then be used primarily as temporary holding area in the event of schedule slippage or minor repair purposes.

7. In conjunction with the foregoing, the writer wishes to register the following items since they have contributed to the variable winds affecting the CORONA program and the atmosphere at VAFB:

ITEMS:

- A. The covert nature of the Discover Program based as it was on providing a test-bed vehicle for experimental and research payloads, tended to enlist the enthusiastic support and cooperation of all associated with the enterprise and a strong desire to limit membership in the "club" had an effect in holding down "need-to-know" security approvals. It should be noted that the AF personnel associated with the project, at that period, were equally zealous in maintaining the "exclusiveness" of the group.
- B. The Gilpatric Directive (March 1962) had the following effect on the CORONA program:
 1. Discover Project was "terminated" by SSD.
 2. The project, however, was quickly resurrected under an AF project number which after a series of changes is currently shown as Project 241. Meantime an AF reorganization at SSD caused the CORONA project to come under the purview of SAFSP (Gen. Greer). This organization had always been "openly" identified with AF satellite photo reconnaissance efforts i.e. Samos, etc.
 3. CORONA project tended to lose its "uniqueness" when grouped, organizationally, with similar endeavors and the resultant "cross fertilization" that soon occurred.
- C. The increased technical staffing by AF on CORONA soon resulted in the placement of an AF staff

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100070040-3

DDS&T-5444-65

at "L" Building and gave rise to a "squatters' rights" mentality by the military.

D. The LMSC/AP management does not extend to VAFB. AP technical representatives interface frequently with the "L" Building technicians and process each payload through the "L" Building process until flight; however the two groups do not report to a common head. LMSC/AP management has been endeavoring to extend their control to include "L" Building since 1960 but it has been successfully resisted in each instance by LMSC/VAFB [redacted]. Subsequently, there have been frequent attempts to enlist the support of the government representatives at AP in these attempts. Government intervention would not appear to be warranted unless the payload and project were being jeopardized by the squabble.

25X1

E. It should be understood that we are completely dependent on the AF for security support at VAFB in the event that an emergency should develop. Although the Headquarters Security Representative is usually present during launch operations, he is not openly identified but in practice works through the LMSC/VAFB Security Officer and Launch Operations Control Officer. Therefore, amicable relations continue to be a necessity since Headquarters Security does not have any assets of its own at VAFB.

[redacted]
Security Staff, OSP

Attachments:

- A. Cable - [redacted]
- B. Cable - [redacted]
- C. Cable - [redacted]
- D. Memorandum - Accident Emergency
Security Procedure
- E. Memorandum - [redacted] (13-15 July 66)
- F. DOD Directive (Circular) - Security and
Public Information Policy for Military
Space Programs, Dtd. March 23, 1962

ILLEGIB